Natural Resources, Investment and Long-Term Income by Dlisraios Papyrakis & Reyer Gerlagh
This paper can be downloaded without charge at: 
 
The Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Note di Lavoro Series Index: 
http://www.feem.it/Feem/Pub/Publications/WPapers/default.htm 
  







The opinions expressed in this paper do not necessarily reflect the position of 









Natural Resources, Investment  
and Long-Term Income  
Elissaios Papyrakis and Reyer Gerlagh 
  






























Natural Resources, Investment and Long-Term Income  
 
Summary 
We study the negative correlation between natural resource-abundance and long-term 
income focusing on the savings-investment channel. We first present empirical evidence 
on this channel and then develop an OverLapping-Generations (OLG) model to study 
the issue. In this model, savings adjust downwards to income from natural resources, 
and investment in capital contributes to knowledge creation, a feature based on 
endogenous growth theory. We analyze the link from resource income future income 
through savings and investment. Natural resources have two counteracting effects on 
income. In the short term, resource wealth augments income, but in the long-term, it 
decreases income through a crowding-out effect on capital and knowledge. We discuss 
different scenarios under which the resource curse is most likely to take place. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Over the last three decades a negative correlation between resource-abundance and economic 
growth has been observed as a general pattern (Gylfason 2000, 2001a, 2001b, Leite and 
Weidmann 1999, Papyrakis and Gerlagh 2004, Rodriquez and Sachs 1999, Sachs and Warner 
1995, 1997, 1999a, 1999b, 2001). Countries rich in minerals, oil, fish banks and agriculture tend 
to grow at slower pace compared to resource-scarce countries. Despite the potential beneficial role 
that resource abundance may play in fostering economic development, experience over the last 
decades reveals that natural resources seem to frustrate rather than promote economic growth. The 
OPEC countries, rich in natural wealth, experienced on average a negative rate of GDP per capita 
growth over the last four decades (Gylfason 2001b). Alaska, the richest U.S. state in natural 
resources with vast fish banks and oil reserves, was the only U.S. state experiencing a negative 
income growth rate the last two decades. In contrast, resource-scarcity was no obstacle to 
economic development for countries such as Switzerland, Singapore, Japan and South Korea that 
surged ahead during the last decades. 
  Figure 1 illustrates the relation between natural resources and income with a scatter plot of 84 
countries. Growth of GDP per capita between 1975-96, adjusted for initial income, has been set 
out against resource-abundance as measured by the share of natural capital in total capital. The 
figure also presents the estimated regression line and the adjusted-R
2. Data on GDP per capita and 
natural capital are provided by the 6.1 Penn World Tables of the Center for International 
Comparisons at the University of Pennsylvania (CIC), (2002) and the World Bank (1997) 
respectively.
3 As shown in the figure, there is a significant negative statistical association between 
the two variables. An increase in the natural capital share by 10% results in a decrease of annual 
                                                 
3  Although earlier observations on natural capital would be preferable in order to avoid endogeneity, 1994 is the 
only year for which data on natural capital are available from the World Bank Database. Gylfason (2001) argues 
that the share of natural capital is still a good proxy for resource-abundance, since resource-abundance is not a 
variable varying substantially over time. Indeed, the results in all tables can be reproduced by using alternative 
measures of resource abundance, such as the Sachs and Warner (2002) measure of the share of primary exports 
in GDP in 1971 or the share of agricultural production in GDP for the same year.   4
growth by about 0.8%. The regression line shows that on average, a natural capital share of 
around 12% implies economic stagnation in terms of growth. 
  In the literature, the resource curse is often associated with a crowding-out logic (Sachs and 
Warner 2001). Natural resources are not harmful to growth per se but tend to crowd-out growth-
promoting activities. We mention three channels. First, natural resources reduce institutional 
quality, as they induce rent-seeking behaviour and corruption. Gains from bribing officials and 
from forming politically powerful interest groups to obtain privileged access to the resource-rents 
rise (Krueger 1974, Leite and Weidmann 1999, Gray and Kaufmann 1998, Torvik 2002). Second, 
resource-abundance tends to deteriorate the terms andreduce the degree of openness. A major 
cause is an overvaluation of the local currency and the resulted loss of competitiveness, as well as 
the imposition of tariffs and quotas that are supposed to protect domestic producers (Auty 1994, 
Torvik 2001, Sachs and Warner 1995). Third, natural resources reduce the investment in high-
quality education and skilled-labour. Resource booms are often followed by a contraction of the 
manufacturing sector, for which human capital is an important production factor and the demand 
and returns to educational quality successively decline as well (Gylfason 2001a, Sachs and 
Warner 1999b). 
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Figure 1. Resource-Abundance and Economic Growth   5
  This paper is concerned with a fourth channel, namely the role of resource-abundance in 
crowding-out investments. Papyrakis and Gerlagh (2004, Table 4) argue that the investment 
channel is probably the most important channel in terms of its contribution to the resource curse. 
There are various mechanisms that can explain the crowding out of investments. World prices for 
primary commodities tend to be very volatile and this creates uncertainty for investors in 
resource-abundant economies (Sachs and Warner 1999b). Additionally, resource booms reallocate 
factors of production from the manufacturing sector to the primary sector. Since it is often the 
manufacturing sector that is characterized by increasing returns to scale and positive externalities, 
this shift in production factors reduces the productivity and profitability of investments  (Sachs 
and Warner 1995, 1999a, Gillis et al.1996). As another mechanism, Atkinson and Hamilton 
(2003) show that governments often spend resource rents on public consumption. The few 
countries that use resource rents for public investments are those that have avoided the resource 
curse. 
  Our analysis combines the insights from the various studies mentioned above. We develop an 
overlapping-generations model to demonstrate how public spending of resource rents decreases 
national savings. Furthermore, we show that the decrease in the level of investment is exacerbated 
when, in turn, labor productivity (through technology or education) depends on the level of 
investment. The decline in income may more than offset the increase in resource revenues, when 
we take account of the decrease in savings and the responsiveness of  technology to investment. 
  The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides empirical evidence to the negative 
correlation between alternative measures of resource-abundance and savings, investment, and 
growth. Section 3 presents the OLG model, and explains how resource-abundance crowds-out 
savings and investment. Section 4 compares the steady states of the OLG model under different 
parameter scenarios and provides numerical examples of the resource curse hypothesis under 
alternative assumptions. Section 5 concludes.   6
2. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE: RESOURCE-ABUNDANCE, SAVINGS, INVESTMENT AND GROWTH 
In this section we graphically depict correlations between several measures of resource-
abundance, savings, investment and growth in order to establish empirically the relations that we 
study in our theoretical analysis of section 3. Data on GDP per capita, investment and savings are 
provided by the 6.1 Penn World Tables of the Center of International Comparisons at the 
University of Pennsylvania (CIC), (2003). Data on natural capital and agricultural production are 
provided by the World Bank (1997) and the Sachs and Warner dataset at the Center for 
International Development at Harvard University (CID), (2002). The causal chain linking 
resource-abundance to economic performance we study here operates in three steps: first, 
resource-abundance discourages national savings, second, lower national savings frustrate 
investment, and third, lower investment slows down economic growth. 
  Figures 2 and 3 depict a scatter plot of the share of net national savings in GDP set out against 
two measures of resource abundance. Both scatter plots indicate that resource-abundance tends to 
significantly decrease the level of savings in the economy.
4 Figure 2 points out a significantly 
negative correlation between national savings and the share of agriculture in GDP. Agricultural 
production can explain by itself almost half of the overall variation in savings across the sample of 
107 countries. It is striking to see that negative net national savings throughout the period 1975-96 
characterizes the majority of countries with a share of agricultural production above 35%. Many 
resource-abundant countries seem to suffer from over-debt problems. Sao Tome and Principe, 
where agriculture makes up about a quarter of the total economy, has the lowest net savings rate 
of the sample. Over the last two decades, it had an average current account deficit ratio of almost 
–40%, and a debt value as a percentage of GDP close to 400% at the end of the 90’s. 
 
                                                 
4 The correlation is significant at the 1% level in both scatterplots.   7
y = -0.644x + 23.130
       -(9.950)
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Figure 2. Savings and Agriculture 
  Figure 3 shows a similar scatter plot for 84 countries taking the share of natural capital in 
total wealth as a proxy of resource-abundance. The results are equally revealing and the negative 
correlation is highly significant at the 1% level. We notice also that the coefficients for natural 
wealth are of similar magnitude in both regressions.  
y = -0.598x + 18.181
         (-5.185)
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Figure 3. Savings and Natural Capital 
  As a second step, we investigate whether our data support the assumed positive correlation 
between savings and investment. Figure 4 depicts, for a cross-sectional sample of 113 countries, 
the relation between net national savings and domestic investment for the 1975-96 period. Indeed,   8
we find a highly significant and positive correlation between the two variables. The 
correspondence is less than one-to-one, which is not surprising, since foreign investment can 
compensate for a lack of national savings when an economy offers attractive opportunities. 
Nonetheless, it is a resource-scarce country, Singapore, which has an agricultural product close to 
zero, with the highest savings and investment ratio: above 44%. 
y = 0.395x + 11.107
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Figure 4. Investment and Savings 
 
  The sample used for Figure 4 is fairly diverse; the relation between national savings and 
domestic investments becomes stronger when we focus on a more homogeneous group of 
countries, such as a sample of 27 OECD countries. Figure 5 is restricted to this group, and shows 
that savings can explain almost all variation in investment levels, and the estimated coefficient 
almost doubles. In OECD countries, most of the national savings is converted into investment.    9
      y = 0.6809x + 6.33 
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Figure 5. Investment and Savings (OECD) 
  Finally, Figure 6 shows the significant and positive correlation between economic growth and 
investment for a cross-sectional sample of 113 countries. We corrected economic growth for 
initial income, so that our data reflect the economic growth rate explained by other factors than 
convergence. A 10% increase in the investment ratio increases on average the annual economic 
growth rate by almost 1.4%. To summarize, our data reveal three major relationships: first, 
resource-abundance varies inversely with savings, second, investment is positively correlated to 
savings, and third, economic growth depends positively on investment. Together, there seems to 
be ample statistical evidence that investment is a significant crowding-out channel through which 
resource-abundance frustrates economic growth.   10
y = 0.134x - 2.05
       (5.466)
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Figure 6. Investment and Growth 
  
3. MODEL SPECIFICATION 
The model employed in this paper extends the usual OLG models by containing reference to a 
primary sector that provides the consumers with pure resource rents, and by including a 
technology spill-over from the capital stock to a labour productivity variable. The model 
distinguishes discrete time steps, t∈T={1,…,∞}. 
A. Demography 
  We assume that in every interval two generations live, an old and a young generation. At the 
beginning of a period, a new generation enters the model and the previously old generation leaves 
the model, so that there is a turnover in population. Each generation is indexed by their date of 
entering the model t (as a subscript). Each individual’s lifetime consists of two periods. The 
generations work when young and live from savings when old. We thus only examine the adult 
part of the life-cycle, i.e. from the age of 20 onwards, and each interval consists of a period of 
about 30 years. Population grows exponentially at a rate n: 
Lt = (1+n)Lt-1   (1)   11
where Lt stands for the population size. Each individual provides inelastically one unit of labour  
during her youth time and retires at the second period of her lifetime. Therefore Lt also measures 
the supply of labor.
 
B. Producers 
  There is a simple production sector for a man-made consumer good Yt, where physical capital 
Kt, technology ht and labour Lt are combined to produce output Yt. We assume a constant returns 





 , 0<α<1.   (2) 




1–α  (3) 
We assume a simple form of learning-by-doing based on the endogenous growth models 
developed by Romer (1990) and Aghion and Howitt (1992), where human capital or technology ht 
is a by-product of physical capital production. The rate of knowledge or technological 
accumulation depends directly on the rate of physical capital accumulation. We assume the 




  (4) 
Since each period covers about 30 years, we assume that the capital of the previous period fully 
depreciates, and we set the capital stock equal to the level of investment of the previous period, 
kt = it–1/(1+n).   (5) 
Markets for labour and capital are competitive so that the interest rate and labour wage per labour 











respectively. Taking account of the endogenous channel for human capital (eq.(4)) the output, 
interest, and wage equations become: 
yt = kt
α+(1–α)π  (8) 
rt = αkt
(α–1)(π–1) – 1,





  Each generation maximises its lifetime utility derived from its two-period consumption 









t+1(1+n)and is assumed to be logarithmic, which implies a unitary inter-temporal 
elasticity of consumption. The variable c
t
t+1 denotes the consumption of the old in period t+1, 
divided by Lt+1, whereas ct
t
 is defined as the consumption of the old in period t divided by Lt; 
the multiplication with (1+n) corrects for this change in unit of measurement.Thus: 
Ut = ln c
t




where ρ>–1 is the pure rate of time preference. Higher values of ρ represent a larger preference 
for current compared to future consumption. The restriction ρ>–1 rules out a negative weight on 
second-period consumption. Notice that the utility function is differentiable, concave and strictly 
increasing in its arguments.   
  Each generation divides its labour income (wages) in the first period between its first period 
consumption and savings, st. These savings are used to finance their second period consumption.    13
c
t
t + st = wt , (12) 
c
t
t+1 = [(1+rt+1)/(1+n)]st .  (13) 




t+1 indicate the first-period wage, the interest rate between the first and 
second-period, and the level of consumption per capita during her two lifetime periods. Notice 
that when writing variables in intensive form, we should correct for population growth. Over the 





t+1 (1+n)/(1+rt+1) = wt ,  (14) 
  Now, we extend the economy with a natural-resource base (e.g. oil reserves) that generates 
resource rents Gt, or gt per person, at period t. For convenience of the analysis, these rents are 
assumed to be a proportion q of that period’s total income Yt. In the appendix, we show that 
results do not change much when resource rents are assumed independent of the income level Yt. 
The distribution of resource rents over generations will determine its effect on savings. We 
distinguish two resource policies. First, resources are considered public property and the rents are 
used to pay for public expenditures such as social security. Second, resources are considered 
common property and the rents are equally distributed over all consumers. This paper focuses on 
the first resource policy, when resource rents are used for public expenditures. In the appendix, we 
briefly analyse the second case. 
  We assume that the resource rents are used for social security; i.e. in every period, resource 
rents are paid to the retired generation. The second-period budget constraint becomes: 
c
t
t+1 = [(1+rt+1)/(1+n)]st + qyt+1.  (15) 





t+1 (1+n)/(1+rt+1) = wt + qyt+1(1+n)/(1+rt+1).   (16)   14
  Each generation maximises utility subject to the budget constraint. The first order conditions 







  (17)   
The distribution of consumption over time does not depend on resource-income or labour income. 
It only depends on the interest rate, population growth, and the pure rate of time preference. 
  Substitution of the Euler equation in the budget constraint (eq.(16)) gives consumption c
t
t as a 
function of the interest rate, the rate of time preference, population growth, and labour and 
resource income. Thus: 
c
t
t = [(1+ρ)/(2+ρ)][(wt + qyt+1(1+n)/(1+rt+1)] (18) 
Savings, st, will be given by: 
st = wt – c
t
t = [1/(2+ρ)] wt – [(1+n)(1+ρ)/(2+ρ)(1+rt+1)] qyt+1.  (19) 
The savings curve is upwards-sloping with respect to the interest rate. An increase in the interest 
rate lowers the net present value of the resource revenues and increases the need for savings. 
When substituting for yt, rt and wt from equations (8), (9), and (10), the savings equation becomes: 
st = [(1–α)/(2+ρ)] kt
α+π(1-α) – [(1+n)(1+ρ)/(2+ρ)α] qkt+1
 
  (20) 
D. Equilibrium 














t and it stand for total consumption of the older and younger generation and total 
investment, respectively. Equation (21) indicates that total production inclusive of resource rents   15
can be used for either consumption or investments. The value of consumption of the older 






 =  (α+q)yt  (22) 
The remainder of the manufactured income (1–α)yt is used by the younger generation to both 
consume and save. Thus, equation (12) becomes: 
c
t
t  + st =(1–α)yt   (23) 
Equations (21)-(23) combined reveal the saving-investment balance: 
it = st.  (24) 
The savings-investment balance, together with the capital identity (5) and the savings equation 
(20), enables us to write the equilibrium as a recursive dynamic equation for kt:  
(1+n)kt+1 = [(1–α)/(2+ρ)] kt
α+π(1-α) – [(1+n)(1+ρ)/(2+ρ)α]qkt+1  (25) 
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  (26), 
where  ψ′>0,  ψ′′<0,  ψ(0)=0,  ψ′(0)=∞,  ψ′(∞)=0. This implies that the sequence kt  is 
convergent, and there is a unique non-trivial equilibrium level of capital per person denoted by k
*.  
We set kt+1 =  kt in equation (26) in order to calculate the steady-state value of capital per capita. 
This provides us with:  
1/(1 )(1 )
(1 )








=  +++ ++ 
  (27)   16
Similarly, the steady-state value of man-made output per capita is given by: 
(1 )
(1 )(1 ) (1 )









=  +++ ++ 
  (28) 
As the parameter q positively enters the denominator and the power coefficients are positive, it 
follows immediately from these equations that the capital stock and output are decreasing in the 
resource wealth parameter q, as stated in the next proposition.  
 
Proposition 1. An increase in the share q of resource rents in income results in a decrease in the 
steady-state levels of capital and output. 
 
The responsiveness of output to resource rents depends, to a large part, on the spill-over effects of 
capital on technology, π. From equation (28), we derive the relative increase of steady-state output 
y
* with respect to the resource share q, that is the semi-elasticity:  
1( 1 ) ( 1 )
0










  (29) 
In turn, taking the derivative of (dy*/dq)/y* with respect to π, we find,
 
 
{( / )/ }
0
dd yd q y
dπ
∗∗
<   (30) 
That is, a larger value for π intensifies the negative effect of resource revenues on the steady state 
levels of capital and man-made income. This result is stated in the next proposition. 
   17
Proposition 2.  A large responsiveness of technology to capital accumulation, as captured by π, 
enhances the negative impact of resource wealth on the steady-state levels of capital and man-
made income per person.  
 
Furthermore, as we can see from (29), the impact of resource rents on long-term output is 
independent of population growth.  
4. The Resource Curse 
 
For the resource curse to materialize, the decrease in output should exceed the increase in income 
brought by the resource rents. In order to investigate the effect of resource rents on total income, 
(1+q)y
*, we compare an initial situation, denoted with subscript ‘0’, in which there is a negligible 
proportion of man-made income q0  = 0, with an alternative situation after a resource boom, 
denoted with subscript ‘1’, when a resource base is discovered and revenues account for 10% of 
man-made income, q1 = 0.1. The change in resource income is about one standard deviation of the 
share of natural capital in GDP used for Figure 1 in the introduction. 
  We use a set of parameter values to test the dependence of the resource curse thereon. In the 
baseline, we set the discount factor ρ equal to one, which implies that individuals value their first-
period consumption twice as much their second period consumption. In terms of pure time 
preference, for periods of 30 years, this assumption is equivalent to a pure rate of time preference 
of 2.3 per cent annually. We assume an annual population growth rate of 1%, which is 
approximately equivalent to a rate of 35% for a period of thirty years.
5 We consider ranges for 
both parameters as the analysis proceeds. We allow the capital share α to vary between 0.30 and 
0.70. The lower value is a reasonable approximation for a narrow concept of physical capital (see, 
e.g. Romer 1996 ch.3), while the latter parameter value is reasonable if we interpret capital kt 
broadly to consist of human capital as well (e.g. see Mankiw, Romer and Weil 1992 and Romer 
                                                 
5 This is the population growth rate for Canada and the U.S. in 1999 (World Bank (WB), 2003).   18
1996 p.134).
6 In the first case, ht can be thought of as a measure of both technological and 
educational improvements induced by capital investments. In the latter case, ht stands for 
technological advancement rather than educational quality. Finally, we let the technological 
parameter π of the endogenous technological channel vary between 0 and 0.9. We evaluate the 
steady-state values for total income (1+q)y
* before and after the resource boom, assuming the 
above parameter values. We calculate the steady-state income differential created by the resource 














  (31) 
The results are depicted in Figure 7. The vertical axis presents the steady-state income differential 
defined by (31). Positive values imply that resource exploitation results in a lower steady-state 
income per capita. The legend on the right hand side of the figure divides the figure area 
according to the magnitude of the resource curse. 
 
                                                 








































Figure 7. Decrease in income following a 10% increase in resource revenues, dependence on the 
technology spillover (π) and the capital share (α). 
 
  As Figure 7 depicts, for almost all parameter values, the steady-state income per capita 
decreases when resource rents enter the economy. Only for the lowest values of π and α, assuming 
a narrow concept of capital and the absence of capital spill-over effects, the economy benefits 
from the resource rents. 
  As the occurrence of a resource curse depends to a large extent on the value for the 
technological parameter π, we investigate which is a plausible range of values for it. Linearizing 
equation (20) around k
* shows that the economy converges to its balanced growth path at a rate 
α+π(1–α): 
kt+1 – k
* ≃ [α+π(1–α)](kt – k
*). (32) 
Most econometric studies find an annual convergence speed in the range between 0.005 and 
0.025, depending on the set of additional variables included and the time span under investigation 
(e.g. Gylfason 2001a p.856, Barro and Sala-I-Martin 1992 p.242, Kormendi and Meguire 1985 
















π α   20
factor α+π(1–α) should lie in the range [0.47,0.85]. For α=0.3, this range is consistent with 
π∈[0.24,0.79]. For α=0.7, this range is consistent with π∈[0.0,0.46]. For all possible pairs (α,π) 
that produce a rate of convergence in the abovementioned range, the resource curse is minimal for 
the pair α=0.30, π=0.24, when it has the value 0.078. It is maximal for the pair α=0.3, π=0.79, 
when it has the value 0.657. The numerical calculations confirm the presence of a resource curse 
for the plausible range of parameters. 
  As a further check of our results, we also investigate how changes in the discount factor ρ 
affect the resource curse effect. An increased value of ρ enhances the resource curse, as can be 
calculated by equation (29): 
d{(d /d )(1/ )} (1 )
0








  (33) 
Barro and Sala-I-Martin (1992 p.226) assume a rate of pure time preference of 0.05 per year for 
their calibrations for the U.S. This approximates a parameter value ρ of 3.35 for a period of 30 
years. One could claim that for a developing country this parameter value could be even higher, 
since consumers in the developing world tend to value current consumption more compared to 
uncertain future consumption. Kotlikoff and Summers (1981) assume a range of (0.02, 0.07) for 
their yearly discount factor for their calibrations, which implies that the parameter value ρ lies 
approximately in the (0.8, 6.6) range for a 30-year period. For our robustness check, we set the 
capital share α and the population growth rate n equal to 0.3 and 0.35, respectively, and let the 
technological parameter π  vary as aforementioned. We allow the discount factor  ρ to vary 
between 1 and 6, so that the values remain in the range adopted by Kotlikoff and Summers 
(1981). We calculate the resource curse effect and present our results in Figure 8. For increased 
values of ρ, the resource curse becomes more acute. For instance, for a π value of 0.5, an increase 


































Figure 8. Decrease in income following a 10% increase in resource on technology spillover (π) 
and the rate of time preference (ρ). 
 
  Finally, we investigate whether our measurements in Figures 7 and 8 conform with empirical 
results found in the literature. Papyrakis and Gerlagh (2003) estimate the resource curse effect for 
revenues from mineral production, for the 1975-96 period, for a sample of 39 countries. They 
conclude that an increase in resource income of 10% decreases long-term income per capita by 
60%, about half of which (30%) is due to a drop in investments in capital and education. The 30% 
decrease can be reproduced by our model for a set of parameters, e.g. for (α, π, ρ) = (0.3,0.5,4), or 
(0.5,0.6,1), or (0.7,0.4,1). 
 
5. Conclusions 
During the last three decades, a tendency has been observed of resource-abundant countries to 
grow at a relatively slow pace. In this paper, we have focused on a situation in which resource 
income decreases the incentive to save and invest. The focus has been motivated by earlier papers 
















π  ρ  22
  We have developed a stylized model in which technology (or education) depends 
endogenously on the level of investment. In this setting, increasing resource rents lead to a 
decrease in investment that multiply over time, and long-term income substantially diminishes. 
For most of the reasonable parameter values, the effect of the decline in investment more than 
offsets the increase in income through resource revenues. Our analysis also reveals that the 
resource curse worsens with an increasing elasticity of output to capital and with a larger inter-
temporal pure rate of time preference.  
  The mechanism described here provides an explanation to the resource-curse hypothesis that 
is an alternative to the mechanisms described in earlier literature. From the literature, we know 
that resource rich countries tend to suffer from currency overvaluations and loss of competitivess 
(Corden 1984), enhanced corruption and rent-seeking (Krueger 1974, Torvik 2002), bad-decision 
making (Sachs and Warner 1999b, Auty 2001), political instability (Collier and Hoeffler, 1998) 
low levels of educational quality (Gylfason 2001a), and low capital investment (Atkinson and 
Hamilton, 2003). Papyrakis and Gerlagh (2004) claim that the last-mentioned channel is most 
important in explaining the resource curse phenomenon. In this paper, we describe a mechanism 
to explain this transmission channel, focusing on the role of resource abundance in crowding-out 
savings by enhancing future income for which no savings are required. Assuming that labor 
productivity depends endogenously on the level of investment, the decrease in savings and 
investment leads to a decline in output that exceeds the increase in resource income, thus 
producing the resource curse.  Such a mechanism can help to understand why resource-abundant 
countries are characterized by smaller shares of savings and investment in their GDP and lack 
behind in terms of long-run income.   23
APPENDIX 
A. Exogenous versus endogenous resource rents 
  The dynamics of our analysis are much simplified by assuming a constant share of resource 
rents in man-made income over time, G = qY, for constant q. It can be the case, though, that 
resource revenues are an either increasing or decreasing proportion of man-made income y as time 
evolves. Figure 9 depicts the relationship between the share of primary exports in GDP in 1990 
and 2001. Data are compiled from the United Nations (UN, 2003) Database of Human 
Development Indicators. As the figure shows, the share of primary exports remained fairly stable 
over a period of eleven years. For instance, the share of primary exports in GDP fell from 30 to 
29% for Panama and rose from 42 to 44% for Kuwait. 
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Figure 9. Share of primary exports in GDP over time 
 
Still, the objective of this appendix is to show that our steady state model results carry over to an 
economy where total resource rents R are exogenous with an adjusting share in total income q, 
instead of the opposed assumption made in the main text. Figure 10 is helpful in this respect; it 
depicts the relation between q, y*, and g. It shows the steady state levels of man-made income y
*, 
resource income g, and total income y
* + g = (1+q)y
*,  as functions of q. We adopt the following 
values for the capital share, α=0.4, the discount factor, ρ=2, the population growth rate, n=1 and   24
the technological externality, π=0.5. The figure shows that, as q increases, the steady-state man-
made income y




* strictly decreases in q. Resource rents g
*  (equal to qy
*) increase initially, and 
then decrease after a certain value of q, that is, when the decrease in output y* more than offsets 













Figure 10. Resource income g, man-made income y*, and total income y*+g 
Graph based on α=0.4, π=0.5, ρ=2, n=1. 
 
Consider the case that a resource starts to be exploited and revenues R are constant and 
independent of other income sources y. The steady-state per capita income level y
* decreases due 
to the resource revenues, and as the economy shifts to the new equilibrium, the share of resource 
revenues in total income q will gradually increase over time.
7 Consequently, for fixed total 
resource revenues R, the resource curse will turn out worse when compared to a situation where q 
is constant. 
                                                 
7 We implicitly assume that an economy is initially on a steady-state point. The assumption is inessential to the 
argument. 
q 
y*, g*, y*+g* 
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B. The case of equal intergenerational distribution of resource rents 
  As an alternative scenario of distribution of the resource rents Gt, we assume that the rents are 
equally distributed between the young and the old generation. Since population increase at an 
exogenous growth rate n, this implies that (1+n)/(2+n) share of the resource rents accrues to the 
younger generation and the rest 1/(2+n) to the older one. The commodity balance for the 
consumer good is the same as in equation (21). The older generation consumes in period t the 
resource rents [1/(2+n)]Gt and the savings from period t–1, which is a share α of manufactured 





 =  (α+q/(2+n))yt
 
  (34) 
The remainder of manufactured income (1–α)yt and resource rents [(1+n)/(2+n)]Gt are used by the 
younger generation to both consume and save. Thus, equation (23) becomes 
c
t
t  + st =(1–α+ q(1+n)/(2+n))yt  (35) 
Equations (21), (34) and (35) combined reveal that the saving-investment balance (24) is 
maintained. By considering the inter-temporal budget constraint for each generation, as in 
equation (12)-(19), we can adjust the savings equation (20), and reproduce the recursive dynamic 
equation for kt as in (25): 
 (1+n)kt+1 = [(1–α)/(2+ρ) ) + (1+n)q/(2+ρ)(2+n)]kt
α+π(1-α)  
  – [(1+n)(1+ρ)/(2+ρ)(2+n)α]qkt+1  (36) 
We set kt+1 =  kt in order to calculate the steady-state value of capital per capita. This provides us 
with the equivalent of (27):  
) 1 )( 1 /( 1
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k   (37)   26
For q=0, the two equations (27) and (37) produce the same steady state capital stock k*. Under 
the scenario of equal distribution of resource rents, however, resource revenues have smaller 
effect on the capital stock, dk*/dq has decreased. Thus, an equal distribution of resource rents is 
less harmful to investments than the social security scheme.   27
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